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NOTES
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS:
IMBROGLIO IN THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
For two days beginning February 28, 1955, John T. Gojack, an officer
of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America,
testified before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities
Committee. Gojack proved to be an obstreperous witness, accusing the
subcommittee of "union-busting" 1 and "witch-hunting" 2 and declined
to answer any questions seeking to connect him with the Communist
Party on the grounds that the committee lacked authority for such in-
vestigations, and that under the First Amendment he was within his
rights in refusing to answer.3 The subcommittee was unsympathetic,
and duly cited him for contempt of Congress.
Gojack was convicted on six counts4 of contempt of Congress under
1. Investigation of Connmnist Activities in the Fort Wayne, Ind. Area; Hearings
before the Conmzittee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 84th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 73 (1955).
2. Id. at 88.
3. Id. at 103. Illustrative of Gojack's frequent objections is the following statement:
To any question this committee propounds that I feel might be a trap for a
frameup with the use of paid informers . . . I will reiterate my basic objection
on the ground of the First Amendment that this committee has no right to go
beyond the legislative investigation field, that if I have done anything of a criminal
nature that is a job for the courts to handle. This committee has no right to
usurp the power of the courts, that this committee is using this hearing and these
questions in an effort to break a union, as your chairman openly stated, and that
this committee has no right to break a union and if the committee had such a
right to break a union, that is not authorized by Public Law 601, if the committee
had that right under Public Law 601 the First Amendment to the Constitution
would forbid it.
The First Amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
4. The specific questions upon which the conviction was based were:
1. Are you now a member of the Communist Party?
2. You have left us under the impression at this point that by reading the news-
papers you knew that Johnson was chairman of the Communist Party of
Indiana and I am asking you if that is the only way you knew Johnson.
3. Mr. Gojack, did Mr. Elmer Johnson or Mr. Aron ever appear and address a
group of people when you were present?
4. May I ask the witness, do you know whether or not Russell Nixon is a mem-
ber of the Communist Party?
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2 U.S.C. § 192. 5 His conviction was affirmed by the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals which found that there was ample evidence of a
legislative purpose furthered by the hearings, that the subject of the
inquiry appeared with "undisputable clarity," that the pertinency of
the questions was clear, and that other grounds given by the appellant,
including the First Amendment rights, were insufficient in law to justify
his recalcitrance. 6
The Supreme Court reviewed the conviction along with five com-
panion cases in Russell v. United States7 and reversed all six, ruling for
the first time that the indictment must specify the subject of the in-
quiry at the hearing from which the contempt citation arose.
Undaunted, the Government reindicted Gojack, this time stipulating
that "the subject of these hearings was Communist Party activities within
the field of labor... ." ,, A second conviction ensued. Petitioner Gojack
again appealed, his main contention being that there was no adequate
proof at the trial of the authority of the subcommittee. The Court of
Appeals disagreed, and in a brief per curiam opinion dismissed petitioner's
argument with the trenchant remark: "We find no merit in these con-
tentions." 9
In June, 1966, the Supreme Court finally disposed of the case in a
unanimous decision:
We reverse. It is now clear that the fault in these proceedings is
more fundamental than the omission from the indictment of an allega-
tion of the "subject of the inquiry" being conducted by the Subcom-
5. Did you take active part in the peace pilgrimage to Washington which was
organized by one of the "front" organizations known as the American Peace
Crusade?
6. What method was used to get you as an original sponsor [of the American
Peace Crusade]?
Gojack v. United States, 280 F.2d 678, 679 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
5. This statute, first enacted in 1857, provides:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of
either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter
under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint
or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of
either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared,
refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000
nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month
nor more than twelve months.
6. Gojack v. United States, supra note 4.
7. 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
8. Gojack v. United States, 86 S. Ct. 1689 (1966).
9. Gojack v. United States, 348 F.2d 355, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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mittee. The subject of the inquiry was never specified or authorized
by the Committee, as required by its own rules, nor was there a lawful
delegation of authority to the Subcommittee to conduct the investi-
gation.10
The Gojack disposition marked the ninth consecutive reversal of a
contempt conviction by the Supreme Court since 1961. In each case the
Court managed to adroitly sidestep the fundamental constitutional issue
presented-the boundary between the congressional power of investiga-
tion and the First Amendment protections of speech and assembly-by
confining itself to niceties of procedural or statutory interpretation.
While this technique is consistent with the policy of judicial restraint,"
its exercise in the majority of these decisions amounted to little more
than caviling. As a consequence, the legal status of congressional com-
mittees as well as that of witnesses appearing before them remains in an
unstable form. Most of the cases in this area have arisen from the in-
vestigations of the indefatigable Un-American Activities Committee of
the House of Representatives, whose controversial character brings it
into conflict with both individual rights and judicial authority. In view
of the sensitive issues involved, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court has been unable to take a definitive stand. However, a survey
of the twenty-year dispute within both the Court and Congress casts
doubt upon the expediency of judicial indecision.
PERSPECTIVE
The power of Congress to conduct investigations with the aid of
compulsory process was not mentioned in the Constitution. While the
usefulness of this power was soon recognized, its scope and limitations
required a surprisingly long time to evolve into its present state of con-
fusion.
Official recognition of the investigative power occurred in 1798, when
Congress enacted a statute providing for the summoning of witnesses
and the administering of an oath.12 In 1821 the Supreme Court first
took notice of the coercive power of the legislature over non-members
in Anderson v. Dunn.3 The Court recognized the legislative power to
10. Supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 46 (1953).
12. Act of May 3, 1798, ch. 36 2 Stat. 554.
13. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). This case apparently involved an attempted bribe
of a congressman.
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punish non-members for contempt as necessary to maintain the dignity
and authority of the legislature. Reinforcement came in 1848 when an
attempted challenge of this contempt power through judicial review was
summarily quashed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court in no
uncertain terms:
[E]very court, including the Senate and House of Representatives,
is the sole judge of its own contempts; and... in the case of commit-
ment for contempt in such a case, no other court can have a right to in-
quire directly into the correctness or propriety of the commitment,
or to discharge the prisoner on habeas corpus. 14
This pithy pronouncement was specifically repudiated in 1875 when
another contempt case reached the consideration of the same court
through a habeas corpus petition.15
In the meantime, Congress had enlisted the judiciary in auxiliary sup-
port of this power by a statute,16 the forerunner of the present 2 U.S.C.
§ 192. By providing for criminal contempt Congress sought to impose
more severe sanctions than were presently available, since confinement
by order of a house of Congress could not extend beyond the session
of Congress during which the contempt occurred. The constitutionality
of this statute was upheld in In re Chapman.7
The idea that Congress was the sole judge of its own contempts,
struck down in 1875, was finally interred in 1881 when Kilbourn v.
Thompson 8 reached the Supreme Court. This case involved a suit for
false imprisonment instituted by Kilbourn against the Sergeant-at-Arms
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner had been incarcerated for
refusing to answer questions before a House committee set up to in-
vestigate the bankruptcy of a banking firm which was indebted to the
United States. This matter was at that time being investigated by a
federal district court. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Miller, emphatically pointed out that the affair was solely within the
province of the judiciary, since it involved the private affairs of indi-
viduals whose rights and remedies were beyond the determination of
the committee. The Court conceded that Congress had the power of
compulsory process, but only in pursuit of the constitutionally as-
14. Ex parte Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas. 471,481 (C.CD.C. 1848).
15. Irwin's case, reprinted in 3 CoNG. Rac. 707 (1875).
16. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 1, 11 Star. 798. This statute is basically the same
as 2 U.S.C. § 192, supra note 5.
17. 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
18. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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signed judicial functions such as judging elections and qualifications of
its members and trying impeachments. Justice Miller specifically de-
clined to comment on whether Congress had the power to use com-
pulsory process in gathering information in aid of legislation, the in-
ference being that no such power existed.19
The Kilbourn decision has been condemned for unduly restricting
the scope of congressional probes, since it went so far as to taint with
illegitimacy any investigation regardless of purpose.20 Yet in spite of
its import, the muscle of the Kilbourn decree atrophied through disuse.
It was briefly revived in 1924 by a federal district court 21 as a basis for
releasing on habeas corpus one Daugherty, who had been arrested for
failure to comply with a subcommittee looking into charges of mal-
feasance against the Attorney-General in the Harding administration.
Three years later the Supreme Court reversed this ruling in McGrain
v. Daugherty.2 2 The gist of the latter decision was ". . . that the power
of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function." 23 Reiterating the idea that Congress
was not free to meddle generally in the private affairs of individuals,
being limited to inquiries in aid of the legislative function, the Court
imprudently added that considering the subject matter involved, the
presumption should be indulged that the investigation was to aid in legis-
lation. Furthermore, the Court felt it unnecessary that the authorizing
resolution should declare in advance what the Senate contemplated
doing when the investigation was concluded.24
Hence the McGrain decision, while apparently refining Kilbourn
down to acceptable standards without expressly overruling, in effect
swings toward the opposite extreme. The practical effect was virtual
emasculation of Kilbourn, since, as might be expected, the presumption
of a valid legislative purpose defies rebuttal.25
19. See Alfange, Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court, 30 U. CINC. L.
REv. 117 (1961).
20. See, e.g., Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of In-
vestigation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153, 214 (1926); Ports, Power of Legislative Bodies to
Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1926).
21. Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (S. D. Ohio 1924).
22. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
23. Id. at 174-175.
24. Id. at 178. In support of this latter holding, the Court quoted with approval
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 669, 670 (1897).
25. To illustrate the effect of such a presumption, in Townsend v. United States, 95
F. 2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938), the court considered as
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On the heels of the McGrain decision came Sinclair v. United States26
which outlined the status of the law at that time and which in general
represents the present understanding of the scope and limitations of the
legislative power of investigation. Like McGrain, the Sinclair decision
recognized as unassailable the implied power of Congress to gather in-
formation as "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function..." 27 This power may be used to investigate the administra-
tion of existing laws as well as the need for further legislation. This
power does not include a general authority to inquire into the private
affairs of individuals, nor into the exclusive province of the executive
or judiciary branches, but when a valid legislative purpose exists, these
limitations do not abridge the power .2  The inquiries must be pertinent
to the authorized subject of the investigation. The presumption of regu-
larity obtains to the investigations, but the presumption of innocence
attends one accused of contempt, and the government must plead and
show that the question pertained to some matter under investigation. 9
The score of years following the McGrain case was, with the ex-
ception of a few procedural limitations,30 a period marked by judicial
non-intervention in congressional investigations.31 It became clear that
irrebutable the assertion of the House of Representatives that the investigation was
pursuant to a legislative purpose, saying: "A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as
searching, and as exhaustive as is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers
of Congress .... "
26. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
27. Id. at 291.
28. ld. at 295.
29. Id. at 296, 297.
30. Reed v. County Commissioner's, 277 U.S. 376 (1928) (Congressional committee
must obtain authority of the parent house in order to call on the federal judiciary for
a court order.); Hearst v. Black, 87 F. 2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (A subpoena duces tecum
issued by Senate committee calling for all telegrams sent or received in the city of
Washington over a period of seven months constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure).
31. The more significant cases during this period were: Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (Congress may order the arrest of non-members for
the purpose of obtaining information without first issuing a subpoena where it is ap-
parent that a subpoena will not be honored.); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125
(1935) (Congress can punish for contempt not only for purposes of coercion, but also
for sanctioning the past act of a person who permitted destruction of papers he was
ordered to produce.); United States v. Morris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937) (Conviction for
perjurious statements before congressional committee is valid even though witness re-
turned and retracted the statements).
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the constitutional propriety of the investigatory power, an open question
following the Kilbourn decision, had been foreclosed by McGrain.
ENTER HUAC
With the investigatory power of Congress firmly entrenched between
the lines of the Constitution, the stage was set for testing its scope.
Uniquely suited for this purpose, the Special House Committee for the
Investigation of Un-American Activities-better known as the Dies Com-
mittee after its first chairman-was created by the House of Representa-
tives in 1938. Given a vague authorization to investigate unpopular be-
liefs,32 it was not long before the Committee's activities prompted the
courts to shift their focus from the power of Congress to the rights of
the individuals confronting it. This shift of emphasis, however, was not
accompanied by a shift of attitude.
The Committee's performance during the War years, while occasion-
ally sensational, was on the whole a lack-luster, one-man operation.
Nevertheless, it became a standing committee in 1945.11 In the immediate
post-War period its activities were often in the headlines, and its con-
troversial nature raised questions as to its constitutionality within and
without Congress. 34 Yet it was not until the late 1940's that the courts
first encountered the legal issues it presented. The primary reason for
this lag was that witnesses faced with disconcerting questions were con-
tent to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the
Fifth Amendment, and until 1950 the committee was content with this
embarrassing admission. 35
Beginning in 1946 witnesses began objecting on grounds other than the
privilege against self-incrimination. Their contumacy was often fla-
grant, and the subsequent contempt proceedings brought several novel
32. The committee was authorized to investigate: "(1) the extent, character, and
objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated
from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of
government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation
thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 83 CONG. REc.
7568 (1938).
33. See CARR, TiH HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN AcTIVITIES, 19-21 (1952).
34. Id. at 364-405.
35. Id. at 433.
406 [Vol. 8:400
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questions squarely before the bench, most of which have yet to be
satisfactorily resolved. These issues may be briefly summarized as fol-
lows: 36
(1) Whether the committee's inquiries further any valid legislative
purpose, or whether they are primarily for the purpose of ex-
posing to public shame and obliquy those who subscribe to un-
popular tenets, particularly communism and fascism. This ar-
gument is supported by the paucity of legislation originating from
the committee, and also numerous public statements to this effect
made by members of the committee.
(2) Whether the authorization to investigate "un-American" activi-
ties is too vague to impose limitations on the jurisdiction of the
committee. The problem with such vague authority is that it
provides no standard of conduct for the committee, the House,
or the courts.
(3) Another aspect of the problem of vague authorization arises in
conjunction with the contempt statute, which provides criminal
sanctions for failure to answer questions "pertinent to the ques-
tion under inquiry." If the subject of the investigation is no
more specific than "un-American" activities, there is much force
in the contention that the criminal statute does not afford an
ascertainable standard of guilt as required by the Due Process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(4) The most vexing question is the effect of the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly, which, if given
literal effect, would bar any inquiry into political beliefs and as-
sociations. The alternative to this absolute approach is the argu-
ment that the interest of the state in preserving itself must be
balanced against the right of the individual to privacy.
The first series of contempt convictions to reach the courts of appeals
arose from the 1946 and 1947 hearings. The 1946 investigations delved
into the activities of "subversive" organizations, and citations for con-
tempt resulted when officers of the organizations refused to produce the
36. These issues warrant individual discussion and, therefore, cannot be considered
in this note.
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cdntents of their files.37 The 1947 hearings dealt with the activities of
high-ranking members of Communist organizations in the United States,
the Communist penetration of labor unions, and the Communist influence
in the motion picture industry.3" The "Hollywood Hearings," which
occupied nine days of October, 1947, were more sensational and widely
publicized than was the Alger Hiss expose during the Communist es-
pionage hearings of 1948." 9
..The trend of these decisions was set by the circuit court opinions in
Josephson v. United States4° and Barsky v. United States.41 In each case
the court gave carte blanche to the committee in determining policies,
casting aside the knotty issues posed by the defendants with unreserved
assurance.
. In the Josephson case the defendant had appeared but had refused to
be sworn and to testify. In affirming the conviction the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated:
[M]atters which potentially affect the very survival of our Govern-
ment are by no means the purely personal concern of any one. And
investigations into such matters are inquiries relating to the personal
affairs of private individuals only to the extent that those individuals
are a part of the Government as a whole.42
With this rationale the court disposed of one limitation upon the power
of investigation expressed in the Kilbourn case. As for the requirement
of a legislative purpose, the court accepted as conclusive the declaration
of a legitimate purpose set forth in the authorizing statute, notwith-
standing statements by members of the committee to the contrary. The
fact that the Committee had spawned little legislation in the past was
immaterial. The subject of un-American and subversive activities was
.37. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cit. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
843. (1948); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); United States v. Fleischman,
339 U.S. 349 (1950); Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950); Marshall v. United
States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cit. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950).
38. Contempt convictions of high-ranking Communist Party officials arising from
1947 hearings include United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), Eisler v.
Jnited States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cit. 1948), dismissed as moot, 338 U. S. 189 (1949).
,Convictions resulting from the Hollywood hearings include Lawson v. UnitedStates,
176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cit. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
'39. CAm, supra note 33, at 55.
40. Supra note 38.
41. Supra note 37.
42. United States v. Josephson, supra note 38, at 89.
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unquestionably within the investigating power of Congress. The First
Amendment protection of free speech and assembly is not absolute, but
may be abridged where there is a "clear and present danger." 13 Congress
may surely investigate the extent of existing danger, if any. While in-
valid legislation may result from the information so obtained, that result
cannot be presumed in advance to bar investigation, since valid legisla-
tion may likewise ensue.
By refusing to give any testimony, defendant Josephson lacked stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the authorizing resolution and
the criminal statute as lacking a sufficient standard by which to judge
the pertinency of questions. This contention, with respect to sub-
poenaed records, was disposed of in Morford v. United States.44
In the Barsky case, the defendant used a different tack, claiming that
the authorizing resolution was too vague to validly confer authority
upon the committee. The court thought otherwise; the Resolution
"is definite enough. It conveys a clear meaning, 'and that is all that is
required." .5
Belying this apparent harmony of the Josephson and Barsky opinions
are the forceful dissents by Judge Clark in Josephson,4 and Justice
Edgerton in Barsky.47 Both dissenters found the Un-American Activi-
ties Committee unconstitutional, and their arguments would admit no
compromise. The authorizing resolution did not afford a sufficient
standard of guilt. Also, the investigations violated the First Amendment,
and inflicted punishment without due process of law.
Why the Supreme Court denied certiorari in each case is a moot
question, but undoubtedly the influence of current events of the period
was felt. To declare the Un-American Activities Committee unconsti-
tutional during the height of its glory, when world events had created
an almost paranoidal fear of Communism in the United States, would
have subjected-the Court to severe criticism, to say the least. The tenor
of the times found expression in Lawson v. United States:48
No one can doubt in these chaotic times that the destiny of all nations
hangs in the balance in the current ideological struggle between com-
43. This test was first espoused by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47,52 (1918).
44. 176 F. 2d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 258 (1950).
45. Barsky v. United States, supra note 37, at 247.
46. United States v. Josephson, supra note 38, at 93.
47. Supra note 37, at 252.
48. 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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munist-thinking and democratic-thinking peoples of the world. Neither
Congress nor any court is required to disregard the impact of world
events, however impartially or dispassionately they view them.
In 1949 the Supreme Court agreed to review the conviction of Gerhart
Eisler,49 reputed to be the boss of the Communist Party in the United
States, and who had refused to co-operate with the committee unless he
was first permitted to read a three-minute statement. The case was re-
moved from the docket when Eisler fled to England. The Supreme Court
was content to leave undisturbed the opinions of the circuit courts on
the major issues. In those contempt cases which did reach the High
Court, the discussion was limited to peculiarities of the individual cases. "°
It was not until 1957 that the Supreme Court deigned to consider the
conundrum of constitutional issues arising from the investigations of the
Un-American Activities Committee.
In the meantime, a decision handed down by the Supreme Court was
significant in relation to the problem of authority of investigative bodies.
United States v. Rumely 5l involved the contempt conviction of the sec-
retary of a right-wing organization which published books of a "par-
ticular political tendentiousness." 52 Witness Rumely refused to disclose
the names of persons who made bulk purchases of these publications
before a select House committee authorized to investigate "all lobbying
activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legisla-
tion." 53 In order to avoid the constitutional issues involved,"4 the Court
49. Eisler v. United States, supra note 38.
50. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950). Witness refused to comply with
a subpoena requiring production of certain records. Defense of a lack of a quorum
present to receive records on return date of subpoena was not available since, inter alia,
witness evidenced no intent to comply with the subpoena.
United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950): Respondent, a member of the
executive board of an association, refused to produce records. The defense that re-
spondent did not have custody of the records was not available, since each director
was similarly subpoenaed, and by joint action the directors could have caused produc-
tion of the records.
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950). (Presence on jury of government
employees was not a denial of petitioner's right to an impartial jury); Morford v. United
States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950). (Conviction reversed because defense was denied the op-
portunity to prove actual bias of prospective jurors who were government employees).
51. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
52. Id. at 42.
53. H. Res. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 96 CONG. Rc. 13873 (1950).
54. The Rumely decision removed any lingering doubt about the applicability of First
Amendment rights to congressional investigations. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
44 (1953).
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narrowly construed the term "lobbying activities" to mean representa-
tions made directly to Congress. Acquiescence by the House after the
investigations took place could not serve as retroactive authority for the
prior exercise of the power.55 Hence the contempt conviction failed.
In the Rumely case, the Court made it clear that it would not tolerate
irresponsible use of the power nor condone the unlimited discretion for
the exercise of the authority placed in investigating committees by
Congress. It remained to be seen whether the Supreme Court would
react with similar resolve to the Un-American Activities Committee.
The moment of truth came three years later when Watkins v. United
States5 6 reached the Supreme Court. John T. Watkins, a labor organizer
for the United Automobile Workers, had appeared before the Un-
American Activities Committee in its April, 1954, investigation of "Com-
munist activities in the Chicago area." 57 Watkins answered freely all
questions concerning his own activities, pointing out that he had never
been a card-carrying Communist, but refused to disclose the activities
of past associates which he believed were no longer Communist Party
members. He objected to the line of questioning on the ground that
information sought was irrelevant and beyond the authority of the com-
mittee. His subsequent conviction for contempt of Congress was re-
versed by the Supreme Court in an eloquent if prolix opinion written by
Chief Justice Warren. The Chief Justice impugned at length the con-
stitutional propriety of the committee.55 All those words, however, were
an aside. The reversal, rather, was based upon a denial of due process-
the lack of a sufficient standard of criminality. The question under in-
quiry was never "made to appear with undisputable clarity." 59
The Watkins decision turned upon a procedural point, rather than
substantive law. As Chief Justice Warren pointed out in his closing
paragraph, all that was required of the committee was "a measure of
added care." '0 The committee must clarify the subject of the inquiry,
and upon objection as to pertinency by the witness, explain the relevancy
of the question.
55. Id. at 47, 48.
56. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
57. Investigation of Comnunist Activities in the Chicago Area-Part 3; Hearing
Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess., 4265-4279 (1954).
58. 354 U.S. at 201-206 (1957).
59. Id. at 214.
60. Id. at 215.
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Of the seven justices hearing the case, only Justice Clark dissented,"'
labeling the decision as a "mischievous curbing of the informing function
of the Congress" and criticising its procedural requirements as "unneces-
sary and unworkable." 62
Along with Watkins v. United States, the Supreme Court on June 17
-"Red Monday" to the Court's foes-handed down three other decisions
dealing with Communism and subversion, each unfavorable to govern-
mental interests. 3 The effect of this quartet upon the public was elec-
tric; reaction was immediate and outspoken. With respect to the
Watkins decision criticism was apparently based on a misunderstanding
of its narrow holding. Cutting through substance to form, critics of the
Court variously denounced the Watkins case as "[making] it easy for
treason to be protected," 64 and as "[leveling] most of the erected
barriers against Soviet infiltration." 15
Reaction in Congress was no less emphatic. If the reprehensive tone
of the Chief Justice's opinion was for the purpose of producing in
Congress a contrite heart and a more responsible use of its powers, it was
a dismal failure. The Court's decisions precipitated in the Senate a
bitter struggle over legislative proposals to curb the Court's jurisdiction
which were only narrowly defeated. In the House, Representative
Hoffman of Michigan was so bold as to suggest the impeachment of the
Supreme Court.6 7 Least moved of all by the Watkins decision, the Un-
American Activities Committee merely modified its procedure and
probed onward. 8
61. Id. at 217.
62. Id. at 217, 218.
63. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (reversing fourteen Smith Act con-
victions of Communist leaders); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (invalidating
the dismissal of a State Department employee who failed to get loyalty clearance);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (reversing contempt conviction of
college professor for failure to disclose his classroom teachings to the Attorney General
of New Hampshire, who was investigating subversive. activities in the state).
64. Columnist David Lawrence, New York Herald Tribune, June 19, 1957, at 19. See
BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 163 (1959).
65. Robert Morris, former counsel for the Senate Internal Security Sub-committee,
26 U.S.L. WE.EK 2162 (1957).
66. For a detailed account of the reaction in Congress to the June 17th decisions, see
MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURTS-A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS
127-223 (1962).
67. Cong. Rec., 85th Cong., 1st Sess., CIII, No. 109, 9099 (daily pagination).
68. See BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 166 (1958); Alfange, Congressional Investigations
and the Fickle Court, 30 U. CINc. L. REv. 149, 150 (1961).
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The hostile reception of Watkins and related cases was apparently
heeded by the Supreme Court as a word to the -wise. In 1959 the Court
in a decision as discordant as its tide-Barenblatt v. United States69-
affirmed a contempt conviction by a 5-4 majority.
The Barenblatt case was remarkably similar in its facts to Watkins.0
Lloyd Barenblatt, a psychology instructor at Vassar College,71 was sub-
poenaed to appear before the Un-American Activities Committee in-
vestigating Communism in the field of education.72 Barenblatt had been
named as affiliated with Communist Party groups of the University of
Michigan. Unlike Watkins, he refused to answer questions concerning
his own political activities for reasons contained in an eleven-page state-
ment of objections which he was not permitted to read by the committee.
His objections were overruled and he was directed. to answer the
questions. It was not until he was about to be dismissed that a member
of the committee put into the record a statement of the purpose of the
investigation and the relevance of Barenblatt's activities.73 Barenblatt
expressly disaffirmed reliance on the Fifth Amendment, but challenged
the "power and jurisdiction" of the committee to inquire into his po-
litical beliefs, personal and private affairs, and associational activities.74
It was no mean feat to distinguish factually this case from Watkins,
but Justice Harlan, who had been with the majority in Watkins, was
equal to the task. In a compact opinion he systematically disposed of
each of Barenblatt's contentions. Premising his remarks with the usual
postulates on the investigatory power of Congress, Justice Harlan
turned to the problem of the vague authorization of the committee.
Pointing out that the discussion of this issue in Watkins was merely
obiter dicta, he went on to say that the long history of the authorizing
69. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
70. See Alfange, supra note 19, at 156-164.
71. Barenblatt's contract expired two weeks before the hearing and was, curiously,
not renewed.
. 72. The subject of the hearing was explained by the committee counsel in an opening
statement:
The field covered will be in the main communism in education and the ex-
perience and background in the party by [sic.] Francis X. T. Crowley.
It will deal with activities in Michigan, Boston, and in' some small degree,
New York.
Conmunist Methods of Infiltration (Education-Part 9); Hearings- before the. Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities, House of- Representatives, 83rd Coig, 2d Sess.,
5754 (1954). -
73. Id. at 5813, 5814.
74. Id. at 5807. "
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resolution has clearly established the authority of the committee to in-
vestigate Communist activities.
As to the pertinency claim, the prepared statement of Barenblatt could
not be construed as an objection to the pertinency of the questions.
Furthermore, the relevancy of the questions was made to appear with
"undisputable clarity" by the opening remarks of the committee, by the
testimony of prior witnesses which Barenblatt heard, and by the closing
remarks of the committee to which he did not reply. Finally, the First
Amendment is not an absolute barrier to all inquiry into an individual's
personal affairs. Where, as in the instant case, the right of self-preserva-
tion of the State outweighs the interests of the individual. Finally, the
power of Congress to legislate in the field of Communist activity is un-
questionable: "So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitu-
tional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of
the motives which spurred the exercise of that power." 75
In a vigorous and pursuasive dissent,7 6 in which Justice Douglas and
Chief Justice Warren concurred, Justice Black reached the opposite
conclusions. Justice Brennan filed a separate dissent based on the lack
of a valid legislative purpose. The position of the dissenters was dia-
metric.
On the same day that Barenblatt was decided, the majority took
similar positions in Upbaus v. Wyman,7" affirming the contempt con-
viction of the director of a "Communist front" organization. This prose-
cution, like S'weezy v. New Hampshire,8 arose out of a state investiga-
tion of subversive activities.
The retreat by the Supreme Court in Barenblatt and Uphaus has been
described as a "tactical withdrawal, not a rout." 7 It is a fair conclusion
that the shift of position of the Court-specifically Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter-in Barenblatt was prompted at least in part by public dis-
approval and the threat of remedial legislation. Likewise, the conclusion
that the high ground taken by the five-man majority is a temporary
camp is justified, although two decisions in 1961, Wilkinson v. United
States"0 and Braden v. United States,"' both supporting the Barenblatt
ruling, weaken the argument.
75. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 132 (1959).
76. Id. at 134.
77. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
78. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).See note 63 supra.
79. MuRPHY, supra note 63, at 246.
80. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
81. 365 US. 431 (1961).
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In Wilkinson v. United States, petitioner had no sooner arrived in
Atlanta, Georgia, to stir up opposition to the 1958 Un-American Activi-
ty Committee hearings there, than he was handed a subpoena to appear
before the committee for a repeat performance. He had been before the
committee nineteen months previously, and had at that time refused to
cooperate.
The division of the Supreme Court was identical with the Barenblat
case. The majority found the case indistinguishable from Barenblatt on
its constitutional issues, and affirmed the conviction. The dissenters
found a new element-that the only reason for summoning the petitioner
was harassment, since there was no basis to believe he would give any
new information to the committee. Unlike the majority, the dissenters
felt that the purpose of the committee in summoning the witness was
a proper subject for judicial scrutiny.
Braden v. United States 2 arose out of the same hearings as the
Wilkinson case. The novel issue presented in this case was the witness'
reliance on the Watkins decision in refusing to comply with the com-
mittee. The majority rightly pointed out that good faith does not excuse
recusancy, and a mistake of law is no defense. The opposite view was
taken in the dissent by Justice Douglas, with which Justice Black, Jus-
tice Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren concurred:"'
One would be wholly warranted in saying, I think, in light of the
Watkins and Sweezy decisions that a Committee's undisclosed in-
formation or unsupported surmise [that a witness was connected with
Communism] would not justify an investigation into matters that on
their face seemed well within the First Amendment. If Watkins and
Sweezy decided anything, they decided that before inroads in the
First Amendment domain may be made, some demonstrable connec-
tion with communism must first be established and the matter be plainly
shown to be within the scope of the Committee's authority.
Since Wilkinson and Braden, every contempt conviction arising from
congressional investigations which has reached the Supreme Court has
been reversed on statutory or procedural grounds. Deuteh v. United
States84 was one of the few cases in which the Court found as a matter
82. Id.
83. Id. at 456, 457.
84. 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
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of law, that the questions asked by a committee were not pertinent to
the subject of the investigation. 85 The subject of the investigation was
apparently "Communist infiltration in the Albany or 'capital' area, par-
ticularly in the field of labor." 86 There was nothing in the record to
connect this subject with petitioner's activities while attending Cornell
University. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Cornell was
more than one hundred miles from Albany.
Russell v. United States87 involved the en masse reversal of six con-
victions on a novel procedural requirement. Yellin v. United States8
reversed a contempt conviction on another technicality. The witness
had requested that he be interrogated in an executive session, believing
that a public hearing would injure his reputation. Committee rules re-
quired it to vote on the propriety of an executive session. The request
by petitioner was rejected by the committee's staff directer-a fatal short-
cut.
The resourcefulness of witnesses fighting contempt convictions was
further illustrated in a recent circuit court reversal of convictions in three
companion cases.8 9 Part of the criminal contempt statute makes it the
"duty" of the Speaker of the House, when Congress is not in session, to
certify reports of recusant witnesses before House committees before
they are acted upon by the Department of Justice."0 The Speaker, John
McCormack of Massachusetts, was advised by the House Parliamentarian
that certification was mandatory regardless of the Speaker's personal
judgment. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, finding
85. Other cases reversing contempt convictions for lack of pertinency are: Sacher v.
United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958) (questions posed by Internal Security Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary were not within its scope of inquiry), Bowers
v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953) answer to inquiry of Senate subcom-
mittee investigating organized crime would not further the purpose of the investigation).
86. 367 U.S. at 469, 470 (1961).
87. 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
88. 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
89. Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
90. The pertinent parts of 2. U.S.C. § 194 provide:
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 of this title fails to
appear to testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, as
required, or whenever any witness so summoned refuses to answer any question
pertinent to the subject under inquiry before . . . any committee . . . and the
fact of such failure or failures is reported to either House while Congress is in
session, or when Congress is not in session, a statement of fact constituting such
failure is reported to and filed with . . . the Speaker of the House, it shall be
the duty of the said . . . Speaker of the House . . . to certify, and he shall so
certify, the statement of facts aforesaid . . . to the appropriate United States
Attorney....
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it "the consistent legislative course that the Speaker is not under a 'man-
datory' duty to certify... ." 91
The inherent conflict between the Supreme Court opinions in Watkins
and Barenblatt provides a fertile field for speculation and argument as
to the underlying motivations which produced the inconsistency and the
manner in which it will eventually be resolved. Reading Watkins in the
strict sense of the Barenblatt interpretation, it is clear that Barenblatt
represents today the most authoritative statement by the High Court on
the constitutional issues involved in congressional investigations. Yet the
fact remains that the Court in each case discussed the problems at length
and approached, if it did not reach, conflicting conclusions. As stated
by Professor Harry Kalven:
On the most literal level it is true that Watkins and Barenblatt can
be read together consistently as Justice Harlan does. But the impres-
sion will not down that the cases are really deeply inconsistent, and
that it might have been better to say so candidly and overrule Wat-
kins .... Yet it is also possible that the future may not read Baren-
blatt as overruling Watkins. We may see instead to powerful prece-
dents so close on their facts that future courts will for all practical
purposes be free to choose between them and decide that it is one
and not the other that controls the case before it.92
Perhaps the best explanation of the narrow holding in Watkins is the
recognition by the Court that ultimate responsibility for use of the con-
gressional power of inquiry should lie with Congress.93 The hypothesis
that Watkins represented an appeal to the legislature to exercise that
responsibility, couched with a threat of judicial invalidation if the ad-
vice went unheeded, is suggested by the closing paragraphs of Chief
Justice Warren in Watkins:
We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the
ample scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional
depository of legislative power. Equally mindful are we of the in-
dispensable function, in the exercise of that power, of congressional
investigations. The conclusions we have reached in this case will not
91. Wilson v. United States, supra note 82, at 201.
92. Kalven, Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. Cm. L.
REv. 315, 321, 322 (1960).
93. See id. at 322, 323.
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prevent the Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any
information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our scheme
of government .... It is only those investigations that are conducted
by the use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect
the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment. That protection
can be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separa-
tion of power from responsibility and which provide the constitu-
tional requisite of fairness for witnesses. 94
That the appeal failed was amply demonstrated by the upheaval it
caused in Congress. Barenblatt forced the court to either make good its
threat, or back down. The retreat by a majority of justices is some-
what puzzling, since by the time Barenblatt reached the Supreme Court
two years later, the crisis had passed.95 Perhaps this withdrawal was
prompted by threats of remedial legislation. Alternatively:
It is conceivable that some of the Justices could have acted on the
theory that the Court, having reminded the other branches of govern-
ment as well as the general public of the commands of the Constitu-
tion, could best protect civil liberties by allowing non-judicial officials
to exercise responsibility for achieving the most satisfactory recon-
ciliations between conflicting and competing rights. This has long
been the ideal of judicial restraint.9 6
The least likely explanation is that the divergent views of the Court
sprang from fundamentally different interpretations of the intendment of
the First Amendment. Rather, the crux was how, when, and by whom
its protections were to be applied. The solution, at least for the majority
of Justices, was a matter of political expediencey.
The question is, however, academic. The effect of the two decisions
was, and still is, to place the law in this area in an unsatisfactory state
of ambivalence.
Professor Kalven's prediction that the Court might select the most
appealing of the two precedents has been borne out through succeeding
cases. Both Watkins and Barenblatt remain weighty precedents, but it
is not likely to be a viable co-existence. In Sacher v. United States97 the
Watkins precedent was controlling. Wilkinson and Braden gave un-
94. 354 U.S. 178, 215, 216 (1957).
95. See MURPHY, supra note 66, at 267.
96. Id.
97. 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
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reserved obeisance to Barenblatt. Deutch clearly favored the Watkins
ruling. Although Watkins turned upon a denial of due process under
the pertinency requirement and Deutch centered upon lack of perti-
nency of the questions, each case involved a close question of fact which
required a process of selective dissection to support the majority view.
Russell v. United States, requiring for the first time that the indictment
specify the subject of the inquiry, was an extension of the Watkins
approach and relied heavily on that precedent. The same may be said
of Gojack v. United States, where the Court again faced the problem
of the unascertainable subject of inquiry.
Yellin v. United States is also in the Watkins camp. Again a conviction
was reversed on a trivial point of procedural due process. The decision
by the majority on the ultimate question of whether the petitioner was
entitled to raise the issue of departure from committee rules in court,
not having objected at the hearing, was, as the four dissenters point out,
inimical to Barenblatt.9 8
Assuming that a contempt conviction could survive the procedural
pitfalls created by inspired judicial scrutiny and reach the High Tribunal
on its basic constitutional issues, it would not be premature to predict that
the Watkins perspective would prevail. It would not be difficult to dis-
tinguish Barenblatt on its facts, and find that in a particular case the
interests of the state do not override the First Amendment rights of the
individual. This conclusion is supported by the fact that since Wilkinson
not one contempt conviction under 2 U.S.C. § 192 has survived the ap-
pellate process, while thirteen have been reversed.99 This record clearly
reflects a hostile attitude toward the Un-American Activities Committee.
If a majority of the present Court could sustain the committee's activi-
ties in the face of the constitutional arguments against it, there would be
little need for the practice of straining to find procedural flaws.
CONCLUSION
The hesitation of the Court to hamstringing the committee, while open
to criticism, is at least understandable. Congressional power is not lightly
to be trammeled, and the Supreme Court can hardly be called pussil-
lanimous. Yet the Un-American Activities Committee still roams at
large, and has indicated no intention to temper its crusade. Its potential
for doing irreparable harm to guiltless individuals requires little elucida-
98. 374 U.S. at 135, 136 (1963).
99. See The New York Times, Sept. 14, 1966, p. 24, col. 1.
1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tion, nor does its record of abuse of power need chronicling here.10 At
present those summoned by the committee are faced with the dilemma
of choosing among submitting to public disclosure of their past and
present activities, associations, and beliefs with its injurious repercus-
sions, invoking the Fifth Amendment, or undergoing a costly and pro-
tracted battle through the courts. Even if the litigation is eventually suc-
cessful, a reversal on a procedural point is scarcely an adequate remedy
for damage long since inflicted.' That the Supreme Court is moved
by considerations other than the written law is praiseworthy, but the
public interest or ulterior policies served by this set of circumstances
appear with less than "undisputable clarity."
Kent B. Millikan
100. See generally BECK, CoNTEMpr OF CONGRESS (1959); CARR, THE HOUSE COMMI=tEE
ON UN-AMERICAN AcImns (1952); OGDEN, THE DIES COm.mrE (1945); TAYLOR,
GRAND INQUEST (1955).
101. Recent attempts to secure court injunctions against scheduled hearings of the
Un-American Activities Committee have fared poorly.
In May, 1965, a hearing was scheduled in Chicago to investigate "certain organiza-
tional changes in the Communist Party." One of the wimesses summoned was Dr.
Jeremiah Stamler, an internationally known heart specialist working with the Chicago
Board of Health. Stamler sought a federal district court injunction against the hearing,
which was rejected by Federal District Judge Hoffman on the ground that the com-
mittee's "motives and purpose cannot be judicially challenged." The order was ap-
pealed. Dr. Stamler walked out of the hearings without testifying. Opponents of the
committee claimed the hearings were an attempt to link the Communist Party with
unions, Negro groups, and pacifist organizations. The hearings were chaotic-five
hundred pickets, one hundred police and scores of U. S. marshals. A total of thirty-
nine were arrested. Of thirteen unfriendly witnesses, three walked out, the rest refused
to testify. The New York Times, May 25, 1965, p. 16, col. 3, May 26, 1965, p. 29, col. 3,
May 27, 1965, p. 20, col. 3, May 28, 1965, p. 36, col. 1.
In an unprecedented move, Federal District Judge Corcoran of the District Court of
The District of Columbia granted a temporary injunction against Un-American Activities
Committee hearings on a bill which would make it a crime to aid the Viet Cong. The
injunction was sought by the American Civil Liberties Union, which requested that
a three-judge panel consider the constitutionality of the hearings. The reaction of the
committee was intemperately expressed by its acting chairman, Representative Pool of
Texas, "I don't think Judge Corcoran has the constitutional right to issue such an
order. I will go to jail until hell freezes over to prove my point." A three-judge panel
quickly convened and dissolved the injunction pending further consideration. The
hearings went on as scheduled, with resulting pandemonia. The New York Times, Aug.
16, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
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